LESSONS FROM EXPERIENCES

IMPROPER LOADING OF AIRCRAFT

An Airbus 320 First Officer heeded tactile cues that all was not right with a takeoff. After a return to the gate, the flight crew observed visual cues that supported their decision to abort the takeoff.

All pre-flight engine start, taxi-out checks completed normally. Final weights had the trim set at 38.3 (unusual aft setting). Once take-off power was added, I immediately noticed a strong nose-up tendency, once which I have not felt on the Airbus. I made a comment to the Captain that something felt odd. With the control stick full down in order to maintain directional control via the nose-wheel, I elected to accelerate a bit to see if relative flow over the horizontal stabilizer would help alleviate the tail-heavy scenario. After about 70 knots, I was hesitant to neutralize the stick, as it gave the feel the nose-wheel was going to lift off the ground. An abort was executed around 70 knots. We cleared the runway and returned to the gate.

I discussed with the captain how the aircraft felt and my concern of possible improper loading of the aircraft. I knew the CG was aft as the trim setting was 38.3,although within limits on paper. After parked at the gate and exiting the cockpit, we began noticing visual cues. With a passenger load of 3 (first class) and 83 (economy class), the majority of the passengers were in the last 15 rows. Once on the ramp, we quickly observed the nose wheel strut in an unusual extended position. We then met with the ramp personnel and reviewed the load manifest. We were told by the Lead agent that the aft limit of this flight today was 1672 units and the aircraft was actually loaded to 1680 units. When queried about the out of range number, we were told 'there is slope built into the limits.' We moved 14 bags to the forward cargo compartment and some passenger to the first class. After waiting for our brakes to cool and a visual inspection by a mechanic, we departed about 60 minutes later. 

Lessons Learned:

Viewing the aircraft with nose strut in an extended position was a major sign that even though on paper we were within limits, in reality the aft CG limit may have been compromised.

Source: CHIRP Feedback Summer 2010

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LEVEL BUST: A QUESTION OF PRIORITIES

I was flying as Captain, left seat, PF. We had been established at FL380 for about 10 minutes with A/P engaged and coupled to FMS. On our way to the entry point for our west-bound Oceanic crossing, I decided to fill out our custom reports for entering the USA.

The first officer,PNF, was on the radio with Oceanic, recording our clearance. In the process of moving a logbook to my lap, I bumped the throttle quadrant where the go-around button is located; This disengages the auto-pilot and initiates a Go-Around. I had not realized what I had done at that moment, as all I heard was the autopilot disengage.I re-engaged the autopilot thinking that all was OK.

I informed the FO that I had been the reason the A/P had disengaged and I had re-engaged it. The FO then noticed that LNAV was not engaged so its was reengaged and we were again on our way to the Oceanic entry point.

The FMS was commanding .75 mach when normal cruise is .80 mach for this phase of flight. I became preoccupied with trying to re-establish normal cruise. It was at about this time, that ATC asked our level. It was FL383 and in a slight climb.

It is at this time that I realized what I had done, having initiated a Go-Around function. I had overridden the Altitude-Hold function. I initiated corrective action to recover that to FL 380, but not before the aircraft reached FL384.

Lessons Learned:

I have learned that only one person in the cockpit should be heads down and the other person should devote full attention to flying the aircraft. Also when a problem does arise, investigate well beyond what appears to be the obvious cause.

Source: CHIRP Feedback Autumn 2009

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ATC CLEARANCE LIMIT

On a clear morning, we were inbound to the UK; normal descent. Reviewed ATIS, contacted London ATC and requested arrival routing. BIG3B Standard Arrival (STAR) was issued. NO delays. 

No preceding aircraft were being issued with holding instructions. The BIG3B routing was followed to BIG. Descent clearance by ATC to 7000ft; Level at 7000ft over BIG. The First Officer (FO) was PF.

The FO questioned me as to the next navigation point. As a former Captain with an international carrier who had flown into LHR many times, I said, "no hold given by ATC, so turn outbound from BIG to pick up the 277 radial for the arrival to ILS 9R. The FO followed my instruction based on my prior experience at LHR.

Up to this point on the approach, the London ATC controller had been the same; however, after the turn to 277 radial, a different voice (probably a supervisor?) called to ask what heading we are flying? I said, " Turning to 277 radial". The controller said," You are supposed to hold over BIG". After a pause we were instructed to continue heading and contact the LHR director director for ILS 9R. We completed a normal approach and landing.


Lessons Learned
 
1. Do not assume holding is not required when the words 'NO DELAYS' are issued by the ATC and no other aircraft are holding. This can be a big trap. Review the STAR more than once. review each and every detail. Question ATC prior to clearance limit to plan going into the hold;if not, request further routing.

2. Do not assume anything from prior experience.Continue to apply good CRM practice at all time.

Note: 
STAR chart referred in the above report contains the boxed warning " DO NOT PROCEED BEYOND BIGGIN WITHOUT ATC CLEARANCE'. This should have been highlighted the Approach Briefing. Also, if you are not sure of your clearance/clearance limit, ask ATC.

Source: CHIRP Feedback Summer 2010